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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                            ----------  
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 On March 9, 1994, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Johnson & Higgins ("J & H"), the employer of 
appellant Burt Sempier.  Sempier now appeals the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on his Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) claim, 29 U.S.C. § 263 (1988),1 and the discretionary 
dismissal of his pendent state law claims.  He also raises as 
error the district court's substitution of a "Bill of 
Particulars" in place of his interrogatories. 
                     
1
.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a) in relevant part provides: 
 
 It shall be unlawful for an employer-- 
  (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's age; 
  (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's age . . . . 
  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to 
review the March 9, 1994 final order of the district court.  
Because the record reflects a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether J & H's asserted nondiscriminatory reasons for 
discharging Sempier are pretextual, we will reverse the summary 
judgment entered in favor of J & H.  We also conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion in substituting its own 
"Bill of Particulars" for Sempier's interrogatories. 
 
I 
 Sempier joined appellee J & H, an insurance brokerage 
and employee benefits consulting firm, in 1968.2  Sempier worked 
as Comptroller until 1971 when he became Treasurer of J & H.  In 
1984, J & H created a new position of Chief Financial Officer 
("CFO"), and the Board of Directors elected Sempier to that post. 
 The parties dispute whether the J & H directors 
criticized Sempier's performance as CFO.  Sempier avers that no 
one advised him that his performance was less than satisfactory 
nor did anyone bring to his attention any deficiencies in his 
performance of his functions.  App. 300.  Robert Hatcher, the 
firm's chairman who was Sempier's friend and had been 
instrumental in Sempier being elected as CFO, states that he was 
generally pleased with Sempier's work.  At the same time, he 
acknowledges that other directors had criticized Sempier's 
                     
2
.  J & H is a closely held New Jersey corporation.  It operates 
as if it were a partnership.  All stockholders are members of the 
firm.  All directors are employees of the firm. 
  
performance.  App. 363-65.  Other J & H directors state in 
affidavits that they believed that Sempier performed below 
expectations.  App. 727 (affidavit of Eric Johnson); App. 778-79 
(affidavit of Kenneth Hecken). 
 In 1985, one year after Sempier assumed his duties as 
CFO, an outside audit of the Finance Department, requested by 
J & H director Eric Johnson, criticized the department's 
operations.  App. 728-29.  After further investigation, Johnson 
sought to have Sempier replaced.  Despite Johnson's criticisms, 
J & H unanimously elected Sempier to the Board of Directors in 
1986.  Hatcher supported Sempier's election to the Board of 
Directors because he believed that this move would assist Sempier 
in improving the Finance Department's operations.  When Sempier 
was elected, J & H required that he execute a letter of 
resignation that would become effective upon a two-thirds vote of 
the Board of Directors.  
  In May 1987, J & H removed Sempier from his 
responsibilities as CFO and made him Chief Administrative Officer 
("CAO") in charge of Management Information Systems ("MIS"), 
Human Resources, Professional Development, and Real Estate and 
Facilities.  Sempier was unanimously reelected to the Board in 
1989.  Both sides dispute how Sempier performed as CAO. 
 Due to the increasing importance of MIS services and 
the department's unsatisfactory record, J & H decided to elevate 
the MIS department's status by hiring a Chief Information Officer 
("CIO"), thereby removing MIS from Sempier's supervision.  
Notwithstanding some lobbying by Hatcher, the firm denied Sempier 
  
the CIO position.  In December 1989, J & H hired Alan Page, who 
is fourteen years younger than Sempier, as CIO.  The directors 
elected Page to the board in 1990. 
 Three months later, J & H hired Thomas Carpenter, who 
is four years younger than Sempier, to assume responsibility for 
Human Resources and Professional Development, starting in May 
1990.  Carpenter's arrival left Sempier with significantly 
reduced responsibilities. 
 In May 1989, before either Page or Carpenter had been 
hired, J & H had instituted an early retirement program to retire 
"redundant" and "poorly performing" employees who were 55 years 
of age or older.  App. 636-37.  The firm intended to use the 
program either to "pull" employees into retirement through 
incentives or to "push" them into retirement through involuntary 
"terminations" which were to be characterized as downsizing.  
App. 637 (Exhibit 8). 
 In April 1990, Hatcher, who was still the Chairman of 
J & H, advised Sempier to retire early with certain enhancements 
to his existing retirement package.  Hatcher stated that Sempier 
had "lost credibility" with unnamed senior managers.  App. 301.  
Sempier refused to retire.  Hatcher responded, using strong and 
unequivocal language, that Sempier had no choice but to retire or 
to be forced out.  App. 302. 
 Between April 1990 and April 1991, J & H engaged in 
extended, and occasionally bitter, negotiations with Sempier 
seeking to obtain his retirement or resignation.  In January 
1991, David Olsen succeeded Hatcher as Chairman of J & H.  When, 
  
in the spring of 1991, Sempier told Olsen that he had hired a 
lawyer, Olsen told Sempier that he could no longer return to 
J & H and should vacate his office.  App. 81.  At the same time, 
Olsen wrote the firm's general counsel that "[i]t's obviously 
time for hardball."  App. 80.  After Sempier consistently refused 
to retire, the Board made effective Sempier's previously executed 
resignation in June 1991. 
 Sempier filed an age discrimination claim with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, received a right to sue 
letter, and instituted an ADEA suit in the District of New Jersey 
with pendent state law claims for  breach of contract as well as 
violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and the 
New Jersey Business Corporations Act.  J & H answered that 
Sempier had been discharged for poor performance. 
 At the outset of the litigation, Sempier served two 
sets of interrogatories and a series of document requests on 
J & H.  When J & H refused to respond to a substantial portion of 
the discovery requested, Sempier sought an order from the 
magistrate judge which would have compelled J & H to respond.  
The magistrate judge denied Sempier's motion.  On appeal, the 
district court judge vacated the order of denial but remanded the 
dispute to the magistrate judge without entering an order 
compelling discovery.  On remand, the magistrate judge relieved 
J & H from answering the original two sets of interrogatories and 
required that Sempier draft a third set of interrogatories.  App. 
563-64.  After J & H refused to answer almost all of these 
interrogatories, Sempier again sought a second order compelling 
  
discovery.  The magistrate judge denied Sempier's motion to 
compel answers and ordered J & H to provide information 
responding to a "Bill of Particulars" drafted by the court.  App. 
576.  On appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate 
judge's order and added one question of its own to the "Bill of 
Particulars." 
 Between November and December 1993, the parties 
disputed whether J & H had complied with the court's orders to 
answer the court's questions and to provide documents.  In 
December, Sempier filed additional motions for an order to compel 
discovery and for partial summary judgment.  J & H replied with 
its motion for summary judgment. 
 The district court granted J & H's summary judgment 
motion on the ADEA claim and dismissed the remaining pendent 
claims without prejudice.  The district court expressed concern 
that Sempier had not made out a prima facie case because of an 
inability to show that he was a qualified employee or replaced by 
a sufficiently younger employee to raise an inference of age 
discrimination.  Nonetheless, it turned to J & H's asserted 
nondiscriminatory reasons for Sempier's discharge and Sempier's 
evidence of pretext.   
 The district court found that J & H had come forward 
with two alleged reasons for Sempier's discharge: (1) that 
Sempier's reduced responsibilities did not justify his continued 
presence on the Board of Directors and (2) that Sempier's poor 
performance had justified the reduction in his responsibilities 
and eventual discharge.  Moreover, the district court held that 
  
Sempier had not produced sufficient evidence to allow a jury to 
find that J & H's alleged nondiscriminatory reasons were a 
pretext for discrimination.  Accordingly, the court entered a 
judgment in favor of J & H, denied Sempier's motion for partial 
summary judgment, and dismissed Sempier's pendent state law 
claims without prejudice. 
 Sempier filed a timely appeal.  
  
II 
A. 
 When we review a grant of summary judgment, we apply 
the same test that the district court should have applied 
initially.  Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 
(3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. dism'd, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when the admissible evidence fails 
to demonstrate a dispute of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 56(c) (1994).  When the moving party (here, J & H) does not 
bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet 
its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving 
party's (here, Sempier's) evidence is insufficient to carry its 
burden of persuasion at trial.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).  Thereafter, the nonmoving party creates 
a genuine issue of material fact if sufficient evidence is 
provided to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at trial.  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477  U.S. 242, 248 (1986).   
  
 In reviewing the record, the court must give the 
nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.  Josey 
v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 637 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1077 (3d Cir. 
1992); Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 900; see also id. at 901 
(discussing the impropriety of credibility determinations on 
summary judgment); Josey, 996 F.2d at 639 (same).   
 
B. 
 Sempier prosecuted his case on the "pretext" theory 
announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973) and later clarified in Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).3 
 As applied to ADEA cases, the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case by showing that (1) he is over 40, (2) he is 
qualified for the position in question, (3) he suffered an 
adverse employment decision, and (4) he was replaced by a 
sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age 
discrimination.  Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897.4  This showing 
                     
3
.  Although the pretext framework originated in the context of 
Title VII, it has been applied to the ADEA.  See, e.g., Geary v. 
Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School, 7 F.3d 324 
n.4 (3d Cir. 1993). 
4
.  Sempier's complaint appears to suggest that J & H violated 
the ADEA not only by discharging him as an employee but also by 
removing him as a director.  For the most part, the record and 
the parties' briefs treat these two events as functionally 
identical.  Whether the ADEA extends to cover Sempier's status as 
a director is a function of Sempier's duties and not his title.  
See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 
  
creates a presumption of age discrimination that the employer 
must rebut by stating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the adverse employment decision.  Hicks, __ U.S. at __, 113 S. 
Ct. at 2747; Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897.  The plaintiff then has 
the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's stated reasons 
were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination.  
Hicks, __ U.S. at __, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 
897.  He may do this through direct or circumstantial evidence of 
falsity or discrimination.  Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., Inc., 897 
F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990); Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 898-99. 
 Moreover, to defeat a summary judgment motion based on 
a defendant's proffer of a nondiscriminatory reason, a plaintiff 
who has made a prima facie showing of discrimination need only 
point to evidence establishing a reasonable inference that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.  
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  A plaintiff 
is not required to produce evidence which necessarily leads to 
the conclusion "that the employer did not act for the 
nondiscriminatory reasons."  Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 
(..continued) 
1348-49 (1992) (considering the definition of employee under 
ERISA); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89-91 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(considering the test for who is covered under the ADEA); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Zippo Manufacturing Co., 713 
F.2d 32, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies 
Association, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
plaintiff's status as a director did not prevent the application 
of the ADEA to plaintiff's position as an employee), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983).  To the extent that Sempier on 
remand pursues relief related to his status as a director, this 
issue should be resolved by trial on the basis of the parties' 
proof of his functions at J & H in that capacity. 
  
821 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019 
(1988). 
 
 III 
 Without holding that Sempier failed to establish a 
prima facie case, the district court questioned whether Sempier 
made out a prima facie case of discrimination.  The district 
court doubted that Sempier had shown that he was qualified to 
work as the Chief Administrative Officer of J & H and doubted 
that he was replaced by a sufficiently younger employee to raise 
an inference of age discrimination. 
 We note however that the prima facie case under the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext framework is not intended to be 
onerous.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.  The prima facie case merely 
"raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume 
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not 
based on the consideration of impermissible factors."  Furnco 
Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
 
  
 A. 
 We determine a plaintiff's qualifications for purposes 
of proving a prima facie case by an objective standard.  Weldon 
v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990); Jalil v. Avdel 
Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 707 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1023 (1990).  "[W]hile objective job qualifications should be 
considered in evaluating the plaintiff's prima facie case, the 
question of whether an employee possesses a subjective quality, 
such as leadership or management skill, is better left to" 
consideration of whether the employer's nondiscriminatory reason 
for discharge is pretext.  Weldon, 896 F.2d at 798.  "Thus, to 
deny the plaintiff an opportunity to move beyond the initial 
stage of establishing a prima facie case because he has failed to 
introduce evidence showing he possesses certain subjective 
qualities would improperly prevent the court from examining the 
criteria to determine whether their use was mere pretext."  Id. 
at 798-99.   
 Here, the district court misapplied this rule when it 
evaluated Sempier's qualification by reference to J & H's 
subjective criticism that Sempier lacked "management oriented" 
skills and leadership ability.  App. 895.  Sempier had the 
objective experience and education necessary to qualify as a 
viable candidate for the positions he held.  He had held 
executive level positions at J & H for over twenty years.   
 Sempier also relied on the affidavit and depositions of 
Hatcher, J & H's chairman.  Hatcher had testified that he had 
been satisfied with Sempier's performance.  App. 895.  In 
  
response to this record, the district court observed, "[a]lthough 
it would be unusual for a corporation to place an unqualified 
individual in an executive position, it is not unimaginable."  
App. 896-97.  In so stating, the district court failed, as 
required on summary judgment, to consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Sempier, the nonmoving party.  See Josey 
v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 637 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1077 (3d Cir. 
1992); Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 900.  Indeed, the district court 
apparently inferred that Sempier was unqualified for the position 
he held. 
 Contrary to the inference of the district court, if we 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Sempier, the 
record of his twenty years employment as an executive, his record 
as Comptroller and then Treasurer of J & H, his election to the 
Board on two occasions, and his appointment as Chief Financial 
Officer and then as Chief Administrative Officer leads to the 
almost inevitable inference that he was qualified for the 
position from which he was discharged.  As we have said in a 
similar context, "[t]hus, [plaintiff's] satisfactory performance 
of duties over a long period of time leading to a promotion 
clearly established his qualifications for the job."  Jalil, 873 
F.2d at 707.  Sempier's qualifications therefore satisfy the 
second prong of the prima facie case that Sempier was charged 
with establishing, thus putting to rest the doubts raised by the 
district court. 
 
  
 B. 
 To complete his prima facie case, Sempier does not need 
to produce compelling evidence or conclusive proof that J & H's 
adverse employment decision resulted from age discrimination.  
Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 900.  Rather he may point to a sufficient 
age difference between himself and his replacement such that a 
fact-finder can reasonably conclude that the employment decision 
was made on the basis of age.  Maxfield v. Sinclair Intern'l, 766 
F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1985).  Nor 
is there any particular age difference that must be shown.  Id.  
Different courts have held, for instance, that a five year 
difference can be sufficient, Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 
533 (9th Cir. 1981), but that a one year difference cannot.  
Gray, 957 F.2d at 1087. 
 The district court in this case considered only the 
four year age difference between Sempier and Carpenter, who had 
taken over some of Sempier's responsibilities.  However, we are 
not limited to considering only Sempier's final replacement.  
Four months prior to the date that Carpenter became responsible 
for Human Resources and Professional Development at J & H, a 
substantial portion of Sempier's other functions were transferred 
to Alan Page.  Page is well over ten years younger than Sempier.  
App. 711.  The combined differences in age between Sempier on the 
one hand and Page and Carpenter on the other is clearly 
  
sufficient to satisfy the fourth prong of a prima facie case by 
raising an inference of age discrimination.5 
 
 IV 
 A. 
 Having concluded that the record is more than 
sufficient to dispel the district court's doubts as to Sempier's 
prima facie case, we turn now to consider the evidence of J & H's 
alleged reasons for Sempier's discharge.  As we earlier stated, 
after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the 
                     
5
.  J & H contends that we cannot consider the transfer of 
Sempier's duties to Page because it occurred outside of the 300 
day period for filing a separate claim of age discrimination.  
J & H's Brief at 38; see 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (providing a 300 day 
period in which to file an administrative charge).   
 
 The argument is disingenuous.  J & H relies on the 
incremental removal of Sempier's management responsibility over 
Management Information Systems to justify Sempier's dismissal; 
however, J & H asks us to limit our consideration of Sempier's 
case to the facts that fall within the 300 days immediately prior 
to when Sempier filed his administrative charge.  Although 
Carpenter was the last person to assume any of Sempier's 
responsibilities, the process that led to Sempier's eventual 
discharge began with the transfer of MIS authority from Sempier 
to Page.   
 
 The statute of limitations for filing a charge of 
discrimination may have barred our consideration of the transfer 
of MIS authority to Page if that was Sempier's cause of action, 
but it does not prevent us from considering that event in order 
to determine whether Sempier has raised an inference of age 
discrimination as a part of his prima facie case.  See United 
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977) (barring a 
separate claim of discrimination, but permitting use of the prior 
events as evidence to prove a case of discrimination based on a 
separate claim); Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 
1420-21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 379 (1991). 
  
employer must produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination created by the prima 
facie case.  Hicks, __ U.S. at __, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; 
Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897.   
 Here, J & H has presented two reasons.  First, J & H 
states that it terminated Sempier because his company duties no 
longer justified retaining him in his position.  Second, it 
contends that Sempier performed those duties poorly.  J & H 
attempted to establish each of these justifications through 
affidavits of J & H executives and directors.  As we understand 
the record, J & H's nondiscriminatory reasons for Sempier's 
discharge come down to this:  Sempier performed so poorly that 
almost all of his responsibilities at the firm were transferred 
to others, leading ultimately to Sempier's discharge. 
 J & H produced the affidavits of two directors, who had 
previously supervised Sempier, reflecting the directors' 
discontent with Sempier's work.  App. 778-79, 783-84 (affidavit 
of Hecken); App. 726-32 (affidavit of Johnson).  Additionally, 
Hatcher's affidavit averred that many directors did not regard 
Sempier highly and that Hatcher had used his influence to have 
Sempier elected to the Board against the other directors' wishes.  
App. 365, 369-70.  To corroborate these assertions, J & H 
included a consultant's report that criticized the operations of 
the finance department during 1985-1987 when Sempier served as 
CFO.  App. 738-749.  Finally, the company produced documents 
disclosing that Sempier received less compensation from the 
  
directors' merit compensation pool than some of the other 
directors who held comparable positions. 
 
 B. 
 On the other hand, Sempier claims that these 
allegations of poor performance are not worthy of credence and 
are no more than a pretext for discrimination.  The Supreme 
Court, in Saint Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, __ U.S. __, 113 S. 
Ct. 2742 (1993), recently clarified the showing of pretext that a 
plaintiff must make to win a discrimination case.  Rejection of 
the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation does not compel a 
verdict in favor of the employee, but it permits the trier of 
fact to infer discrimination and find for the plaintiff on the 
basis of the allegations of discrimination in his prima facie 
case.  Hicks, __ U.S. at __, 113 S. Ct. at 2749; Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994); Seman v. Coplay Cement 
Co., 26 F.3d 428, 433 (3d Cir. 1994).  "The factfinder's 
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the [employer] . . . may, 
together with the elements of the [employee's] prima facie case, 
suffice to show intentional discrimination."   Hicks, __ U.S. at 
__; 113 S. Ct. at 2749.   
 Accordingly, "a plaintiff who has made out a prima 
facie case may defeat a motion for summary judgment by either (i) 
discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or 
directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or 
direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating 
or determinative cause of the adverse employment action."  
  
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in original).  If the plaintiff 
produces sufficient evidence of pretext, he need not produce 
additional evidence of discrimination beyond his prima facie case 
to proceed to trial.  Id. 
 Pretext is not demonstrated by showing simply that the 
employer was mistaken.  Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
88 (1993).  Instead the record is examined for evidence of 
inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an inference that 
the employer did not act for its stated reasons.  Josey v. John 
R. Hollinsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 Thus, we turn to the record to determine whether 
Sempier has produced sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find 
that J & H did not terminate him for poor performance.  Sempier 
emphasizes three evidentiary threads which create a genuine issue 
of material fact.  He first points to statements in his own 
affidavit, in Hatcher's affidavit, and in Hatcher's deposition 
testimony that his performance was satisfactory.  App. 321, 325 
(Sempier); App. 363-65 (Hatcher); App. 797 (Hatcher).  The 
district court found that Hatcher's additional statement that 
other directors did not agree with Hatcher's favorable assessment 
undermined the credibility of Hatcher's assertions of 
satisfactory performance.  While we may or may not find Sempier's 
self evaluation and Hatcher's assessments of Sempier's 
performance to be compelling evaluations of Sempier's work, it is 
neither our role nor the district court's role on summary 
judgment to compare the testimony of various affiants and decide 
  
who is credible.  Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 901; Josey, 996 F.2d at 
637.  
 The district court, citing Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 
F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1991), also concluded that Sempier's self 
evaluation was meaningless because only J & H's evaluation of 
Sempier's performance was at issue.  Billet states that the 
inquiry into pretext centers upon the employer's beliefs and not 
the employee's own perceptions.  Id. at 825 ("However, 
[plaintiff's] view of his performance is not at issue; what 
matters is the perception of the decision maker.").  Nonetheless, 
Billet does not stand for the proposition that the employee's 
belief that his performance was satisfactory is never relevant.  
Billet concluded that the employee's assertions of his own good 
performance were insufficient to prevent summary judgment where 
the employer produced performance reviews and other documentary 
evidence of misconduct and insubordination that demonstrated poor 
performance.  Id. at 818-22.   
 Where, as here, Sempier asserts not only that he 
performed well but that he never received any unfavorable 
criticism that his performance was poor or inadequate, the jury 
could conclude that J & H's failure to fault Sempier's 
performance for the twenty years prior to the negotiations 
leading to his discharge makes suspect its post hoc assertions of 
poor performance.  This is especially true when J & H has failed 
to produce any other evidence of poor performance or make 
specific allegations of Sempier's deficiencies. 
  
 Sempier next points to two formal performance 
evaluations from 1988 and 1989 in which Hecken, Sempier's 
supervisor, wrote that Sempier's performance was satisfactory.  
App. 308-19.  In considering these evaluations, the district 
court stated, solely on the basis of Hecken's affidavit, that 
"[t]he evaluations were a first attempt by Defendant to open the 
lines of communication between lower level directors and the 
senior members of the board to whom they reported.  Viewed in 
this light, they are of little value in determining Plaintiff's 
true level of performance."  App. 906.  In so stating, the 
district court ignored the testimony of Hatcher at his deposition 
that any critical comments concerning Sempier's performance 
should be recorded in the performance evaluations.  App. 799.  
Hatcher also said that the compensation committee had previously 
used the evaluations in determining directors' compensation.  
App. 824-26.  On summary judgment, it is not the court's role to 
weigh the disputed evidence and decide which is more probative. 
 Finally, Sempier points to the coercive early 
retirement program that J & H instituted shortly before it forced 
Sempier's resignation.  J & H documents showed that the company 
instituted this program to generate a significant number of 
retirements largely through monetary incentives.  The district 
court correctly concluded that the use of an early retirement 
program to dismiss redundant or underperforming employees is not 
by itself a violation of the ADEA.  See Gray v. York Newspapers, 
957 F.2d 1070, 1080-81 (3d Cir. 1992); Colgan v. Fisher 
Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1422 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 
  
S. Ct. 379 (1991).  On the other hand, an early retirement 
program designed to force employees who reach a senior age to 
leave or face significant pressure to resign or retire might 
itself create an inference of age discrimination.  Gray, 957 U.S. 
at 1081 (citing Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 
826, 828-29 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987)).  It 
is impermissible to force older employees to choose between 
retirement or termination in an effort to eliminate older workers 
on account of their age. 
 The record clearly discloses that Hatcher told Sempier 
in no uncertain terms that he could either retire, face 
continuing pressures to retire, or be terminated.6  The record 
also reflects a mandatory policy at J & H that directors must 
retire at set intervals corresponding to age.  Later, after the 
company learned that Sempier had sought legal counsel, Olsen, 
J & H's Chairman, told Sempier to pack his office and leave.  
While this evidence does not itself establish age discrimination, 
a jury might reasonably determine from these events that J & H 
offered Sempier early retirement as an effort to remove him 
because of his age and not because of poor performance. 
 In cases such as the present one, the question for the 
court is whether the record "could support an inference that the 
employer did not act for non-discriminatory reasons, not whether 
                     
6
.  In the April meeting at which Hatcher recommended early 
retirement, Sempier recites that Hatcher told Sempier that 
unnamed J & H managers "would let me [Sempier] rot, would cut my 
balls off and otherwise make it unpleasant for me to stay."  App. 
302. 
  
the evidence necessarily leads to that conclusion that the 
employer did act for discriminatory reasons."  Chipollini, 814 
F.2d at 900 (emphasis in original); see also Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 
764 (stating that the plaintiff need not show more than that the 
employer's articulated reasons were implausible to survive 
summary judgment).  When the evidence is read in the light most 
favorable to Sempier, a jury could reasonably find that J & H did 
not terminate him because of poor performance but rather 
discharged him because of his age. 
 
 V 
 To recap, once Sempier had made out a prima facie case 
of age discrimination, a presumption arose that J & H had 
discriminated against him.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.  J & H 
dispelled that presumption by coming forward with a 
nondiscriminatory reason for Sempier's discharge, leaving nothing 
but the permissible inference of discrimination created by the 
prima facie case.  Hicks, __ U.S. at __; 113 S. Ct. at 2748-49.  
Sempier's attack on J & H's stated reasons for his discharge 
leaves us with the paradigmatic case in which each party has 
produced testimony and evidence that conflicts on the ultimate 
issue -- whether Sempier was discharged for poor performance or 
because of his age.  The resulting conflict must be resolved by a 
jury and cannot be resolved on summary judgment.  Thus, the 
summary judgment entered in favor of J & H must be reversed.7 
                     
7
.  Sempier also raises as error the district court's denial of a 
partial summary judgment in his favor on the issue of liability.  
  
 
 VI 
 In addition to challenging the district court's order 
which granted summary judgment to J & H, an order which we now 
hold must be reversed, Sempier also complains that the district 
court abused its discretion in ruling on his discovery efforts.  
In so doing, Sempier contends that he was prevented from 
marshalling additional evidence establishing that J & H's 
proffered reason for his discharge was pretextual.8   
 We normally do not become involved with "nitty gritty" 
rulings on discovery matters.  Nor do we generally engage in 
exercises to determine whether a party's interrogatories are 
relevant or are unduly burdensome.  This appeal, however, 
requires that we review the actions taken by the magistrate judge 
and the district court judge with respect to discovery sought and 
answered by the parties.  While we will not examine each jot and 
(..continued) 
Sempier argues that J & H presented no evidence of his poor 
performance.  As we have discussed in text, the record reflects 
that both Sempier and J & H have adduced conflicting evidence 
over the reason for his discharge.  This resulting conflict could 
not be resolved by summary judgment in Sempier's favor. 
8
.  Sempier strongly disputes J & H's contention that he had 
chosen to resist J & H's renewed motion for summary judgment 
without completing the depositions that had been scheduled.  
Sempier claims that the documents he sought from J & H were 
essential in order to conduct his remaining depositions.  He 
asserts that the district court for that reason alone should have 
denied J & H's motion for summary judgment and should have 
permitted Sempier to complete his discovery.  (Sempier Reply 
Brief at p. 23.) 
  
tittle of the discovery process, it is important to our analysis 
that some background be furnished.  
 Sempier's complaint was filed in April 1992.  In June 
1992, Sempier served his first set of interrogatories and a 
request for production of documents.  In July 1992, Sempier 
served a second set of interrogatories with a second request for 
production of documents.  Unfortunately, not all of the 
interrogatories that were served have found their way into the 
record, and thus, into the appendix.  We have examined those that 
have been reproduced in the appendix, and we find it difficult to 
understand how the magistrate judge could have condoned the 
answers given by J & H.  Moreover, we are perplexed by the 
failure of the magistrate judge or the district court judge to 
compel responsive answers to the interrogatories -- almost all of 
which appear to us to be relevant and directed to the issues of 
Sempier's employment, performance and relationship with J & H.   
 For example, Interrogatory No. 36 sought the name of 
each and every person who had supervision and/or control over 
Sempier from January 1, 1986 through the termination of Sempier's 
employment.  It also sought, with respect to each such supervisor 
identified, the job title, the department supervised, the duties 
and responsibilities of the job, the date on which he or she 
assumed the supervisory position, and, if the individual was not 
still employed, the date and reason of termination and the last 
known address.  True, that interrogatory sought as well the date 
of hire, date of birth and educational background, but those 
three inquiries, if not deemed relevant in the district court's 
  
judgment, could have been excised and the remainder of the 
interrogatory answered.  Yet J & H objected to the interrogatory 
on the grounds that it was "overbroad, unduly burdensome, and 
exceeding the scope of permissible discovery."  J & H then 
referred Sempier to a J & H Position Statement which does not 
even appear to be part of the record.   
 Again, Interrogatory No. 44 asked J & H if it 
voluntarily terminated the employment and/or relationship of 
Sempier with J & H.  J & H's response reads:  "Defendant refers 
plaintiff to pages 3 through 17 of the J & H Position Statement."  
The following interrogatory, Interrogatory No. 45, sought the 
dates on which the decision to terminate Sempier was made, and 
J & H's response was "See Interrogatory No. 44."  Interrogatory 
No. 46 sought the factual basis for J & H's decision to terminate 
Sempier and/or the relationship of Sempier with J & H.  The 
answer given by J & H:  "Defendant refers plaintiff to the J & H 
Position Statement."  The other interrogatories which we have 
reviewed -- all seemingly relevant -- have been answered in much 
the same manner.  All of J & H's answers disregard the 
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 33(a) (requiring separate and complete answers unless 
specific objections are provided); 26(b) (defining the scope of 
discovery) (1993 version).9  
                     
9
.  Lead counsel for J & H is apparently the New York law firm of 
Sullivan & Cromwell.  Perhaps this accounts for the lack of 
familiarity with New Jersey Federal Court practice.  We note, 
however, that J & H had local counsel.  It is a matter of concern 
to us that the discovery practice in this case was so badly 
abused when at the least, local counsel had to have recognized 
  
 Without dwelling further on this subject, we observe 
that the magistrate judge did not compel the answers which 
Sempier sought.  Rather, he relieved J & H from answering the 
various discovery requests and instructed Sempier to issue a 
third set of interrogatories and a third document request.  The 
latter two discovery requests were no more answered than the 
earlier ones.  In lieu of compelling answers to the third set of 
interrogatories served by Sempier, the district court instructed 
J & H to answer a four question "Bill of Particulars."   
 Against this background, we consider Sempier's 
arguments.  Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and our 
jurisprudence, district courts have broad discretion to manage 
discovery.  See, e.g., Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc, 985 F.2d 
1232, 1237 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) (allowing over a one year delay in 
the production of documents is not an abuse of discretion); Beard 
v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming 
monetary sanction for failure to answer interrogatories); Comdyne 
I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1146 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming 
district court order striking the pleadings for failure to answer 
interrogatories).  Nonetheless, the district court's discretion 
has boundaries, and in particular, we frown upon unnecessary 
discovery limitations in Title VII, and hence ADEA, cases.  See 
Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1983).  In 
such cases, other courts have refused, and now we refuse, "to 
(..continued) 
the need to conform to the standards of discovery practice which 
have long been established in the District of New Jersey.   
  
allow procedural technicalities to impede the full vindication of 
guaranteed rights."  Id. at 406.  A plaintiff in an ADEA case, as 
Sempier is here, should not be hamstrung by the district court in 
limiting his discovery.  In substituting a "Bill of Particulars" 
for those means of discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the district court here far exceeded the 
outermost limits on its discretion. 
 Since 1938, civil discovery has been an attorney-
initiated, attorney-focused procedure.  The vast majority of 
federal discovery tools operate, when used properly, almost 
entirely without the court's involvement.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(f) (requiring the parties to devise and submit a discovery 
plan); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 ("[A] party may take the testimony of 
any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral 
examination without leave of court."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) 
(production of documents); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 (providing for 
physical examinations only by leave of the court); see also 
William Schwartzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and 
Discovery Reform, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 703, 714-16 (1989).   
 Indeed under the recent amendments to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(a), which became effective December 1, 1993 in 
the District of New Jersey, a party must provide discovery 
"without waiting [for] a discovery request."  Under this scheme, 
when civil litigation proceeds smoothly, the parties conduct 
discovery with minimal interference from and minimal appeal to 
the court.  Through the discovery process, even before the 
amendments became effective, the attorneys obtain answers to 
  
questions that they feel are relevant to the issues if not 
determinative of the issues.  8A Charles Allen Wright & Arthur P. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2162 (1970).  Nowhere in 
the process is the district court authorized to initiate its own 
questioning or to seek documents for itself.  See John H. 
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 823, 827-30 (1985) (noting the difference between civil law 
procedure in which judges initiate the investigation and common 
law procedure in which the parties conduct the investigation). 
 When the parties stray from this course, Rule 37 
provides the court with tools to give the litigants new and 
proper bearings.  A court may compel answers to interrogatories 
or deposition questions, compel the production of documents, or 
conversely, grant protective orders.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(c).  If these measures fail, a court may order 
facts established, forbid the introduction of evidence, strike 
the pleadings, file a default judgment, dismiss the action, or 
hold a party in contempt of court.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b); see 
also National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 
427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (upholding dismissal of a claim for 
discovery violations); Quinter v. Volkswagen of America, 676 F.2d 
969 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming an order holding a party in 
contempt for violation of discovery procedures).  However, none 
of the weapons in this formidable arsenal include the wholesale 
substitution of court-engineered discovery. 
 The district court was evidently not content with the 
contents of its discovery arsenal.  Rather, it abandoned the 
  
structure and command of the Rules to revive a procedural device 
abandoned in civil practice forty-five years ago.  See Singer 
Manufacturing Co. v. Axelrod, 16 F.R.D. 460, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) 
(noting the elimination of the "Bill of Particulars" in favor of 
interrogatories in 1948); Wright & Miller, supra § 2167 (1970 & 
supp. 1994) (stating that Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 replaced the "Bill 
of Particulars" in equity in 1948 without lament).  Although 
still used in criminal matters, a "Bill of Particulars" has not 
graced the shores of federal civil discovery since the 1950s.  8 
James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 7.06[1] (2d ed. 
1994).  Even in criminal matters, a "Bill of Particulars" is not 
generally considered a discovery device.  Id. (citing among other 
cases United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  In this case, it was not only an unwelcome and 
inappropriate incursion by the district court into the parties' 
dispute, but it severely trenched upon the Rules of Civil 
Procedure which have been crafted to provide information as to 
matters relevant to the issues disputed.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(d)(1). 
 Sempier had served his interrogatories in compliance 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33.  The Rule provides, 
"[e]ach interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in 
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the 
objecting party shall state the reasons for objection and shall 
answer to the extent the interrogatory is not objectionable."  
J & H believed the interrogatories were objectionable and stated 
its objections.  Sempier sought to compel answers. 
  
 The court could have denied the discovery on the ground 
that it was privileged, burdensome, duplicative, or otherwise 
outside of the scope of discovery.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).  It 
could have compelled answers and awarded attorney's fees and/or 
sanctions.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b).  It did none of these things 
nor did it comply with its obligation to consider and rule upon 
each interrogatory to which J & H objected.  See Nestle Foods 
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 109-112 
(D.N.J. 1990); Robbins v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 
49, 57-60 (D.N.J. 1983).  Rather than rule upon the objections, 
the district court decided that "[the] Magistrate Judge . . . 
provided a mechanism (bill of particulars) for further discovery 
regarding the precise issue outlined in this Court's September 7, 
1993 Order."  App. 611. 
 The district court may have disliked its obligation to 
examine each interrogatory and review the magistrate judge's 
ruling.  Regardless of its feelings, the district court, guided 
only by its own discretion and determination of what is important 
or relevant, could not rewrite a party's questions and in effect 
serve its own set of interrogatories.  When the court took upon 
itself to author the questions being asked, it virtually became a 
participant in the parties' controversy in a manner inconsistent 
with fundamental conceptions of the role of a judge in our common 
law system.   
 In this case, the district court reformulated Sempier's 
interrogatories into four broad questions about Sempier's 
performance.  The magistrate judge reframed specific requests 
  
pertaining to the reasons considered by J & H, and the reasons 
upon which J & H actually relied to terminate Sempier, into a 
vague question, "[w]hy were Plaintiff's job responsibilities 
reassigned?"  Pertinent and direct interrogatories, that were 
propounded by Sempier, sought the dates of conversations 
regarding Sempier's performance and the names of the participants 
in those discussions.  Those interrogatories were replaced by the 
district court with a vague and general "Bill of Particulars."  
Because the district court's questions were, with one exception, 
general, nonspecific, and broad, the resulting answers, to the 
extent that they answered the questions at all, were 
uninformative and of little value.  Sempier had good reason to 
draft specific interrogatories and had a right to expect 
correspondingly specific answers.  The district court's 
substitution of its own work product denied Sempier this 
opportunity. 
 We have examined the Supplemental Bill of Particulars 
(App. 766-772) which contains the questions framed by the 
magistrate judge and the district court judge, and we have 
examined closely J & H's answers.  Those answers can best be 
described as an attempt, if not to outwit, then to frustrate all 
legitimate efforts to furnish information to an adversary.10  
Moreover, whereas Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 provides 
that interrogatories must be answered under oath and thus may be 
evidentiary, there is no such provision in the Federal Rules of 
                     
10
.  See note 9 supra. 
  
Civil Procedure for a "Bill of Particulars."  Indeed, there is no 
provision at all for "Bills of Particulars" -- and for good 
reason.  As we have noted, "Bills of Particulars" were replaced 
by the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Wright & Miller, supra § 2167. 
 The district court's action was unauthorized by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in violation of the 
principles of our jurisprudence.  The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which must obtain Supreme Court and Congressional 
approval, not only prescribe the procedures to be followed by 
counsel, but they also prescribe the Rules under which the courts 
operate.  See Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 32 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("Neither we, the Department of State, nor the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts possess the authority to 
circumvent, ignore or deviate from the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which were approved by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
Congress.")  By venturing so far outside the parameters set by 
the Rules, the court abused its discretion. 
 Our discussion and holding here does not leave the 
district court powerless to manage the discovery difficulties 
presented by this and similar cases.  On the contrary, the 
district court has considerable authority and discretion by which 
to resolve discovery disputes.  Indeed, if discovery has reached 
an impasse or a nonproductive stage either through counsel's 
obstinacy, intransigence, or even incompetence, the district 
court can always, through appropriate intervention, suggest the 
  
proper manner in which questions should be asked and the answers 
furnished.  A district court's creativity in this respect is 
unrestricted, although it cannot, of course, disregard the 
commands of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, as in this 
case, substitute a "Bill of Particulars" for a party's relevant 
discovery.  It can, however, always give counsel guidance and 
direction as to the manner in which discovery should proceed. 
 If, after an examination of a party's interrogatories, 
the district court determines that the interrogatories are 
inappropriate, the court can refuse to compel answers.  If a 
party is unable to draft satisfactory interrogatories after a 
reasonable time for discovery has concluded, the court can limit 
further discovery.  If the court feels either party was acting in 
bad faith, it can impose sanctions.  Certainly, if a party, 
without justification, refuses to answer interrogatories in the 
manner required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33, the court 
can compel answers under threat of sanctions.  Any or all of 
these options could have been employed in this case.  Any and all 
of these options would have received substantial deference upon 
review. 
 
 VII 
 We will reverse the summary judgment of the district 
court dated March 9, 1994 and remand.  On remand, the district 
court is directed to vacate the magistrate judge's order of 
August 7, 1993 and to vacate its own order of November 3, 1993 
which approved and modified a "Bill of Particulars."  The 
  
district court is also directed to permit and schedule additional 
appropriate and adequate discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure so that further proceedings, including trial, 
may be conducted consistent with the foregoing opinion.11 
 
                     
11
.  The district court's order of March 9, 1994 dismissed Counts 
Four through Six without prejudice to Sempier proceeding on those 
counts in state court.  Those counts involved state law contract 
and corporate law causes of action.  The record before us is 
accordingly silent as to those matters.  Nor do we know if those 
claims are proceeding in state court.  It will be for the 
district court on remand to ascertain and resolve the status of 
those claims. 
